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A notion of ‘public’ has been transmitted to us through the well-known 
philosopheme of the murdered Chinese. It goes: we are given a magic gift by 
which, through simply pressing a button, every wish we utter will be 
immediately granted, but at a price: every time we press the button, one Chinese 
will die. How many people would refrain from pushing that magic button? This 
question was posed by Francois-René Chateaubriand first, Honoré de Balzac 
later and Karl Polanyi later still (Brie, 2017).   
   This notion of ‘public’ incorporates an obligation to assume responsibility for 
the lives of others, protect society as a whole and, as Immanuel Kant put it, 
embrace a form of world patriotism. This contribution will set off by explaining 
how difficult it is for criminology as an academic discipline to accept such an 
obligation. Three sets of difficulties will be highlighted: first, those experienced 
by criminologists; second, those suffered by the public; and third, those 
challenging public action and social movements.  
 
Criminologists in the marketplace 
 
In many countries, criminologists witness the global decline of universities, 
which are now structured as enterprises under the control of managers. The 
power of the latter is due less to their intellectual strength in some specific area 
of knowledge than to their expertise in managing any business, be that a 
financial institution or a supermarket. Universities, as a consequence, tend to 
jettison critical thinking and adopt a view of themselves as organs of the 
marketplace. Academics are required to gear their research to the boosting of the 
economy, to translate their findings into new opportunities for business, even 
though there is a high probability that many businesses then will end up hiding 
their profits in Panama. Students are charged scandalous fees and are 
encouraged to convert their desire to learn into an expectation for high grades in 
the name of their sacred rights as customers. And while the prevailing economic 
doctrines determine the gloomy prospects of graduates, universities are 
required to address ‘employability’, implying perhaps that they should train 
students to accept zero-hour contracts? When academic staff members are 
moved into new premises, the space to keep books into their minuscule shared 
offices is limited:  
 
‘the dream of our boneheaded administrators is of a bookless and 
paperless environment, books and paper being messy, crumply stuff 
incompatible with a gleaming neo-capitalist wasteland consisting of 
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    Finally, vanity, envy and petty competition, which often connote academic life, 
are exacerbated by the new climate, making universities ‘cribs of the selfish 
gene’, where the pursuit of success leads to mere self-interested action. Against 
this background, it is hard to establish what type of contribution academic 
disciplines might make to the ‘public’. 
   The process that embedded criminology in the marketplace, however, cannot 
be solely imputed to political external forces. There is an endogenous 
mechanism within the development of criminology as a discipline, more 
precisely as an ‘independent’ discipline, that makes its attempt to ‘go public’ 
extremely difficult. In order to claim its own scientific uniqueness, criminology 
has always been tempted to delimit its field of study, and often to distance itself 
from the very mother discipline that gave it birth. I am alluding to classical 
sociology and social theory, which contain notions of public action and conceptual 
traces of ‘social movement’, though such traces form a vague corollary to its central 
concern around conflict and social change.  Often, both the concept of ‘movement’ 
and that of ‘change’ are hidden behind, and coalesce with, notions of instability and 
incumbent menace. Exclusive attention to the latter notions was part of the cost 
criminology had to pay for its ambition to independence. Disciplinary 
independence, in other words, grew out of the ambivalent nature of the social 
forces bringing change, their unpredictability and presumed irrationality. 
Ultimately, confronted with unprecedented industrial and urban development, 
criminology alimented its independence with what I would term a deep 
sociological ‘fear of living together’ (Ruggiero, 2001; 2003). Concepts such as 
‘social change’ and ‘collective action’, which imply public commitment, are less 
useful to the expansion of criminology than variables like ‘fear’ and ‘hell’. As a 
consequence, transitional zones and criminal areas became central scenes of 
enquiry, with the sociological gaze being diverted from more general conflicts.   
    Let us remind ourselves that the major concerns of sociological theory in 
general have always been conflict, movements and social change. Durkheim 
(1960) explains how an unwanted division of labour in society leads to 
movements trying to modify that division of labour (right to combat). Of course, 
for a sociologist avant la lettre like Marx, conflict, movement and social change 
are the core, if not the exclusive issues, on which any theorizing should be based. 
Max Weber (1947) describes ‘class action’ and includes in his reasoning a crucial 
element of subjectivity: collective action requires not only a distinctly 
recognizable condition of social injustice, but also an awareness that such 
injustice is unacceptable, because based on an arbitrary distribution of resources 
and power. Finally, Georg Simmel’s (1978) notion of fluidity and movement 
describes a feeling of dizziness but also one of perpetual change. In his 
Philosophy of Money one perceives a constant conflict between the objectivity of 
technological production and financial exchange, on the one hand, and the 
subjectivity of individuals and groups making choices in their daily life, on the 
othjer. In brief, the founders of sociological thought are concerned with the 
variables and concepts which are central to the study of public action. 
Criminology forgoes these concepts when claiming its academic and scientific 
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independence. Its mission, not only among mainstream representatives of the 
discipline, consists in devising a mere social technology, one which can be 
applied in response to synchronic, immediate and urgent situations. This sense 
of urgency hinders the understanding of the historical dimensions of social 
action, while limiting the criminological horizon to immediate contingencies. 
   Public criminology encounters a similar Gordian knot: the more it talks about 
itself, the more it has to distance itself from social theories: even when ‘conflict’ 
and the ‘allocation of resources’ are brought into the equation, only risible 
conflicts can be addressed and negligible degrees of redistribution achieved. In 
this sense, the ‘arrogance’ detected by Tittle (2004) in public sociology denotes, 
in fact, most criminology, a discipline which needs ‘informants’ not peers, a type 
of social inquiry that needs to teach others in what contexts they are situated, 
which the others presumably ignore. Criminologists, Olympian observers, 
believe they can see the whole picture. ‘The excuse for occupying such a bird’s 
eye view is usually that scientists are doing reflexively what the informants are 
doing unwittingly’ (Latour, 2005: 33). Lack of proximity, in this context, makes 
criminology unaware of change, movement, of how individuals and groups shift 
from one form of association to another, in brief, how they engage in the 
reassembling of the collective. As Bauman (2011: 163) has contended, our 
objects of study are not dumb by nature, but in order to retain our status ‘and to 
secure the sovereign authority of our pronouncements, the objects to which our 
pronouncements refer need first to be made dumb’.  
   This ‘dumbness’ emerges even when re-reading the classical texts of new, 
radical, criminology, where the topics of conflict and collective action constitute 
an extraordinary omission in the range of deviant acts and crimes which, 
allegedly, ‘contribute to human liberation’ (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973). 
Therefore, while deviant hedonistic activity, vandalism (‘kicking back at a 
rejecting society’), forms of individual industrial sabotage (‘working at one’s 
pace’) (ibid: 271), and even ‘some sex crimes’ (sic!) are all included among the 
subjective choices to challenge ‘the social structure and the structure of power’, 
organised collective action is surprisingly excluded. The suspicion arises that 
such omission is due to the very organised nature of collective action, which may 
turn violent, and express too high a degree of subjectivity even for new 
criminologists to handle. In other words, when faced with socially vulnerable 
actors it is always possible for criminologists to attribute a degree of subjectivity 
to those actors and offer an interpretation of their conduct in the form of 
sympathy, whether or not those adopting such conduct explicitly request or 
welcome such sympathy. This is part of the propensity of some criminologists to 
study marginalized communities with a missionary zeal and a honeyed 
paternalism that derive from traditional philanthropy. Similar criminologists 
need their objects of study more than they need them, and in the face of strong 
expressions of subjectivity attributions of subjectivity from without become 
totally inappropriate. Ultimately, the only forms of political action with which the 
new criminologists seem analytically ‘comfortable’ are those embryonic forms of 
social dissent, or even those ‘unconscious’, ‘pre political’ elements of contention 
that one could (naively?) read in conventional criminal acts. In this case, at least, 
criminologists can fulfill their mandate by unveiling the ‘conscious’ meaning 
behind such acts, while their role tends to wither away when consciously 
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organised conducts prove that, at times, actors have nothing to learn from those 
interpreting them.  
   With new developments, for example the emergence of cultural criminology, 
little appears to change. Crime is located in everyday life, a site of drama, tragedy 
and joy, and it is captured as a holistic phenomenon, with ‘its adrenaline, its 
pleasure and panic, its excitement, and its anger, rage and humiliation, its 
desperation and its edgework’ (Young, 2011: 84). But again, all of this describes 
‘transgressive’ acts which remain pre-political in nature, while it is left to 
criminologists to detect in those acts a desire for social change of which the 
‘dumb’ actors are supposed not to be aware. 
 
The eclipse of the public 
 
It is time to revisit ‘the public’, namely the context into which criminologists are 
expected to bring their action.  
   Democracies are successful when they celebrate the public and allow it to 
flourish, when they produce individuals and groups capable of acting as the 
whole community of which they are a part (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1998). By 
contrast, they are unsuccessful when they inspire individuals and groups to 
pursue completely different social orders. I would like to describe such 
unsuccessful democracies as ‘off-shore democracies’, that seem to be shaped by a 
crisis of hegemony leading them to suspend the rules to which they, 
nevertheless, claim loyalty.  
   Secrecy characterizes many operations conducted by contemporary global 
elites, in the economic as well as in the political realm (Urry, 2014). The term 
‘off-shore’, applied to the range of financial irregularities that allow the hiding of 
wealth (Ruggiero, 2017), can also describe contemporary mechanisms of 
democratic decision-making and practices, which in turn are increasingly 
‘hidden’ from public scrutiny. Let us delineate this process.  
   Empirical theories of democracy tend to focus on existing models, so that they 
end up endorsing the status quo as the most preferable arrangement. Inspired by 
a sense of ‘realism’, such theories jettison suggestions of improvement, let alone 
of alternative models, treating them as idealistic, empirically inadequate or 
‘unreal’ (Held, 2006). However, the performance of ‘real’ democratic systems 
cannot be dissociated from the evaluation expressed by those who experience 
the functioning of such systems. Civil society, for instance, may not limit its 
action to the periodical expression of voting preferences, but is likely to put 
forward demands and, in so doing, exercise a form of surveillance or vigilance 
over institutional decisions. A public sphere distinct from the state apparatus, in 
other words, constitutes a key component of what we ought to understand for 
democracy. Democratic decision making, in brief, can be accomplished through 
political action from below. 
 
‘In the historical evolution of democratic regimes, a circuit of surveillance, 
anchored outside state institutions, has developed side by side with the 
institutions of electoral accountability… democracy develops with the 
permanent contestation of power’ (Della Porta, 2013: 5). 
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Non-state aggregations, including independent media and professionals, 
pressure groups, non-governmental organizations and social movements have 
traditionally played such a surveillance function. The latter, in particular, as 
relevant actors and purveyors of collective needs and sentiments, express 
implicit judgments on elites and their activity. What distinguishes democratic 
systems is their specific capacity to respond to such judgments or, to put it 
differently, their ability to deal with contentious politics.  
   Not all politics is contentious, as it commonly consists of elections, 
consultation, ceremony and bureaucratic process (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 
2001). Social movements, instead, do express contentious politics when they 
make ‘contained’ and/or ‘transgressive’ claims, namely when demands are put 
forward through well-established and/or through innovative means. Ultimately, 
democracy distinguishes itself from other regimes in that its elected political 
agents should be able to interact with challengers, with new political entities and 
their innovative collective action (Tilly, 2004; 2007). Democracies, in brief, can 
be classified on the basis of the elasticity of their structures and the degree to 
which they encourage political processes and social dynamism leading to change 
(Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). 
    This classification was proposed by some among the very founders of classical 
political thought, with Machiavelli (1970), for instance, identifying as corrupt 
those systems that proved unable to deal with tumults and other forms of 
troubling dissent. Contention, including violent contention, Machiavelli argued, 
causes no harm, particularly when the elite, through changes in social 
arrangements and legislation, defeats the corrupt elements within itself. Livy’s 
history suggests that the absence of corruption was the reason why the 
numerous tumults that took place in Rome ‘did no harm, but, on the contrary, 
were an advantage to that republic’ (Bull, 2016: 35).  
    Democracies can claim that they are concerned with the pursuit of harmony 
and public wellbeing, but as Dewey (1954) argued, they can hardly claim that 
their acts are always socially beneficial. For instance, one of the most regular 
activities of democracies is waging war. 
 
‘Even the most bellicose of militarists will hardly contend that all wars 
have been socially helpful, or deny that some have been so destructive of 
social values that it would have been infinitely better if they had not been 
waged’ (ibid: 14). 
 
Democratic political acts, therefore, may be presented as socially beneficial, even 
when their anti-social nature prevails.  This is why citizens, Dewey warned, 
should be cautious in identifying their community and its interests with 
politically organized institutions and theirs. While launching this warning, 
Dewey approached an embryonic notion of social movement, stressing that the 
recognition of the harm caused by states on behalf of the public leads the public 
itself to institute its own sphere of action with the purpose of conserving and 
expanding its interests. Democracies striving to achieve unity, on the other hand, 
may do so only by imposing intellectual uniformity and ‘a standardization 
favourable to mediocrity’ (ibid: 115).  They tend to regiment opinions and 
respond to difference with astonishment or punishment: mass production is not 
confined to the factory but covers ideas, an argument that led Dewey to identify a 
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process of ‘eclipse of the public’. While the political candidate, with ‘his firm jaw 
and his lovely wife and children’ (ibid), prepares to make decisions, he also 
breeds indifference if not contempt. We are faced, here, with a crisis of politics as 
perceived around a century ago, when he public grew apathetic, bewildered, 
barred from expressing its opinion or dissent. 
   In brief, off-shore democracies are unable to deal with political contention, to 
interact with challengers, to accept contestation, and to submit choices to 
collective assessment and deliberation. They are incapable of appreciating the 
role of  ‘the public’, thus testifying to a crisis of politics that pushes them in the 
direction of increasing secrecy. Crucial decisions affecting all are made in closed 
enclaves impervious to popular control. 
 
Intolerance and political de-skilling 
 
Intolerance towards public dissent constitutes one of the major manifestations of 
today’s crisis of politics, which hampers the possibility of collective action, 
denies space for negotiation between rulers and ruled, and ultimately prevents 
human communities from representing themselves as agents of their own 
history (Balibar, 2016). In this sense, the very notion of citizenship is ‘under 
siege and reduced to impotence’, while democratic systems take on a ‘pure’ form, 
namely they become capable of dealing exclusively with their own logic and the 
mechanisms of their own reproduction (ibid: 12). Individuals and groups, as a 
consequence, are expelled from their public place (Sassen, 2014). 
   While reducing the opportunities for participatory forms of action, 
contemporary democracies simultaneously expand the sphere of delegation. 
Thus, the electoral process becomes increasingly influenced by private interests 
expressed through the initiative of donors and lobbyists. Soliciting bribes is now 
termed ‘fundraising’ and bribery itself ‘lobbying’, while bank lobbyists ‘shape or 
even write the legislation that is supposed to regulate their banks’ (Graeber, 
2013: 114). 
   While participation is discouraged, enclaves of political and economic power 
become increasingly unreceptive to the moods and needs of the public. Hidden 
from the public, such enclaves lead a process of political de-skilling of the public, 
who grows impotent, disillusioned and, again, apathetic.  
    Lack of participation marks the simultaneous decline of deliberative practices, 
namely those processes leading to the formation of opinions in interaction with 
others. These practices characterize social movements and the way in which 
their horizontal communication produces tolerance for the other and acceptance 
of diversity. The shift in institutional responses to social movements, looking at 
purely technical factors, proves how this communicative process is being 
hampered. Protest raises military responses, aided by crowd-control techniques 
such as ‘kettling’ or ‘coralling’. The former is a metaphor likening the 
containment of protesters to the containment of heat and steam within a kettle, 
and consists in the encircling of demonstrators and their subjugation through 
forced immobility. To avoid allusions to military confrontation, however, the 
latter term is used, which refers to the practice of enclosing animals and 
restricting the territory they occupy. Demonstrators so ‘kettled’ or ‘coralled’, 
being denied access to food, water and toilet facilities, are unlikely to fight and 
defy batons or electrified ‘battle-prods’. Often, growing tired after hours of being 
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surrounded, they may just ask to go home. In some cases, the ‘kettling’ takes 
place well before the agreed location is even reached by protesters, who are 
blocked at bus or train stations and physically prevented from joining the 
demonstration. Regarded as a violation of human rights, these techniques and 
their military corollary increase the cost of protest, eliciting feelings of injustice 
and, therefore, at times strengthening the willingness to participate.  
    Certainly, the militarization of crowd control is perhaps a constant feature of 
democracies, which have often found it particularly hard to recognize the right to 
demonstrate and to negotiate with demonstrators. This feature, however, has 
gained novel prominence with the transformation of public into private space, 
whereby demonstrators are seen as perturbers of the smooth running of 
business, enemies of consumers and deniers of their ‘human right’ to shop. Idle 
demonstrators had better evacuate private spaces, because they do not count, 
they are neither consumers nor labour force. The philosophy behind this shift is 
found in the paradoxical idea that, in countries where dissent is permitted, there 
is no need to dissent: on the contrary, it is in countries where opposition is 
banned that protest is justified. Hence the disingenuous claim that regime 
change, carried out through the invasion of undemocratic countries, is aimed at 
providing their inhabitants with the right to protest.  
 
Revitalizing the public  
 
The argument presented so far is that, as forms of government become 
increasingly elitist and circles and networks of power grow impervious to 
external needs and demands, they are led to dismiss negotiation with any public 
force. It is unlikely that criminology can restore or energize social forces. Rather, 
the revitalization of the public can be achieved through the revitalization of 
social movements, which would raise the density of communication among 
individuals and groups and contribute to the development of cosmopolitan 
identities (Della Porta, 2013). In this sense, criminology cannot go public unless 
social groups restore a public sphere and include all in it, criminologists among 
them, who could attempt through public participation to allay their selfish gene.  
    Restoring the public sphere may lead to collective action, although the 
modality and protagonists of such action will depend on the underlying 
philosophy inspiring it. Traditional social movements take inspiration from 
specific sectors of society (for instance, the industrial working class), their needs 
and demands, which are deemed the core source of contentious action. 
Contemporary social movements, however, may not elect any specific sector of 
society as its vanguard, but rather base their activity on a plurality of forces 
present in the public sphere. The concept of multitude may help identify such 
social movements, as the multitude possesses diverse wills and desires and is 
composed of individuals who constitute a threat to the monopoly of political 
decision making. ‘The challenge posed by the concept of multitude is for a social 
multiplicity to manage to communicate and act in common while remaining 
internally different’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: xiv).  
   Multitudes produce communication, relationships, forms of life, images, ideas 
and affects. They mark a shift from centralized forms of political contention, 
while their networked structure is adaptable to a diversity of struggles. It is in 
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this networked structure that, among other actors, criminologists may find 
space. This is possible if a distinct conception of social change is embraced. 
   Some conceptions of the social world and visions of history see ‘structures’, 
guided by ‘laws’ and animated by ‘forces’, while seeing ‘the public’ as 
fundamentally determined in its action by those structures, laws and forces 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2018). The volition of those participating in public 
action, according to such conceptions, does not affect social change or, for that 
matter, the direction their contentious politics will give to the course of history. 
Public action, in this perspective, is inscribed in a pre-determined design 
indicating the inevitable trajectory of social arrangements, their development 
and ultimate decline. Revolution is on the agenda of history, not in the plans of 
those fighting for it. In these conceptions, intellectuals such as criminologists 
may or may not have a place: they may if they follow the leadership of the 
subjects chosen for carrying out the inevitable outcome of their historical 
mandate-mission; they may not if they claim independence from that leadership 
and claim loyalty to their own professional identity. These conceptions, that we 
may well describe as positivist, require that those participating remain in the 
closets possible contact with the core protagonists of public action, namely the 
sectors of the working population that, according to the historical period, suffers 
more or less the humiliation, exploitation and, in general terms, the most 
stringent contradictions of the systems that will be superseded.  
   Positivist conceptions require scientific analyses not only of concrete 
conditions and historical trends, but also of the values and ideas harbored by 
social and political actors. Because structures, laws and forces are supposedly 
beyond their control, their consciousness is also determined by the position they 
occupy in society and in the productive system. Therefore, ideas that do not 
coincide with those involved in contentious action are deemed ideologies.  
    The conundrum of criminologists, as a consequence, becomes evident. 
Criminologists may chose to unveil the lies represented by ideologies and clarify 
to subjects the ‘real’ values and principles that they should hold, admonishing 
them that their beliefs constitute false consciousness that helps them survive in 
an unjust system. In this case, a patronizing attitude will be put in place that can 
be rejected by the subjects addressed, who might legitimately claim that they 
never dreamed of appointing criminologists (of all people) as their 
representatives or political vanguards. Another choice for criminologists could 
consist in the recognition of their own ideology, namely the hypocritical cover 
that allows them to make sense of their role and position. In this case, however, a 
relentless work of reflectivity and self-analysis would be required to which not 
many criminologists are inured.   
    Distancing themselves from positivist conceptions, participants in public 
action can see people’s choices as the outcome of will rather than the result of 
ready-made programmes inscribed in structures. Action, from this perspective, 
becomes intentional, it signals the willingness of participants to assume risk and 
to pursue their own normative principles. Criminologists, in this case, will have 
to compare their own principles with those held by actors involved in the public 
arena and verify whether risks may be jointly taken with them. This does not 
mean that values and principles constitute the only realm in which 
criminologists can engage, as the material sphere is essential for the 
development of the public. It is in fact when material precariousness diminishes 
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that critique can be revived. This is what we learn, for instance, form resource 
mobilization theory in the sociology of social movements, which hypothesizes 
that not scarcity but availability of concrete and symbolic tools offers social 
groups opportunities for action. Mobilization, it could be argued, is not just the 
result of frustration and discontent, but also of strength and resources. These 
include anything from infrastructures to funds, from the capacity to deliver 
services to non-material items such as authority, moral commitment, trust, skills 
and camaraderie (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). Mobilization, therefore, is a 
process by which aggrieved groups marshal and utilize resources for the pursuit 
of specific sets of goals. It may be determined by the strength of pre-existing 
organization, networks and resources, but it is certainly also propelled by 
collective solidarity, ideological commitment and shared identity. The difficulty 
remains, however, when we attempt to ascertain to what extent criminologists 
are prepared to marshal their resources and moral commitment alongside 
aggrieved groups  
   On the one hand, a public criminology may establish an alliance with powerless 
groups and expose and fight the crimes of the powerful. The difficulty, here, is 
finding out how many criminologists pay attention to this type of criminality, 
within a discipline that is still predominantly focused on conventional deviance 
and the crimes of the excluded. On the other hand, public criminologists may be 
guided by the indignation they prove when faced with the conditions of others. 
Without this emotional reaction, critique is hard to develop, although emotions 
may prove insufficient to produce action for change. Giving voice to the excluded 
while translating their needs into terms that refer to the common good may be a 
solution, but it must be recognized that public criminologists, rather, tend to 
choose their interlocutors among the included. In this sense, something esoteric 
and elitist still remains in the description of ‘public criminology’ as we find it in 
relevant texts (Loader and Sparks, 2010). In some such texts, it seems that 
experts working in academia seek the help of experts working in adjacent areas 
and, while begging for their benevolence, try to improve the lives of others, 
namely non-expert actors. This ‘plea to be nice’ addressed to policy-makers 
displays yet another element of what earlier I have described as missionary and 
paternalistic criminology, which is prepared to stand by the underdogs as far as 
they remain such (Ruggiero, 2012). This type of criminology echoes the call for 
clementia that Seneca (2009) addressed to Nero, elevating clemency (not justice) 
as the ruler’s cardinal virtue. Seneca supported autocracy as a virtuous form of 
government, and clemency, namely the capacity to grant mercy or pardon, as the 
prime prerogative of autocrats. Academics acting as mere ‘mediators’ between 
the socially excluded and the authorities perpetuate the ‘mechanism of 
dominance’ enacted through the expropriation of speech. Unwittingly, such 
mediators may ‘destroy the communicative infrastructure that constitutes the 
basis for a cooperative mobilization and elaboration of feelings of injustice’ 
(Honneth, 2007: 88). Public criminology, without involving those who suffer, 
does not refer to the common good, but to its own good, namely the criminal 





The difficulties highlighted in this contribution pertain to the current state of 
academic criminology, the harsh conditions encountered by the public action and 
the obstacles preventing the development of collective action. These three sets of 
difficulties can be referred to the dichotomy included-excluded as we observe it 
in national as well as international contexts.  
 
‘Included are those who are connected, linked to others – people of 
higher-level bodies such as public services, families, firms, policy-makers 
– by a multiplicity and diversity of bonds’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2017: 
348).  
 
By contrast, the excluded are those whose ties binding them to others have been 
severed, those who have thus been relegated to the fringes of the social system, 
where needs are either invisible or interpreted as ‘problems’. These are the 
‘disaffiliated’, persons whose connections have been successively broken and 
whose existence is regarded as extraneous to the social fabric (Castel, 2008). 
Criminologists have a world of work to do before providing the excluded with an 
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